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THE POLICY OR FUNCTION OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND
NOTES
JOHN S. STRAHORN, JR.I
The law of bills and notes applies to the transactions in which
commercial paper is involved a group of rules peculiarly different from
the normal rules of procedural, property, and contract law which other-
wise would govern them. What is there about bills of exchange, bank
checks, and promissory notes which justifies their being constituted a
corps d'elite of the law? What policy, what end, what function is
sought to be served by applying to bills and notes transactions rules
of law appreciably different from the normal rules which govern busi-
ness activity in general?
The general policy of the law of bills and notes is to encourage
the conducting of money or credit transactions in a commercially desir-
able manner by holding out to transactions so conducted the reward of
a preferred status under the law. This general policy subsumes two
subsidiary policies concerned, respectively, with form and substance
which, with their correlative legal peculiarities and operative facts,
furnish the basis for the classification here to be followed.
The first policy involves the form of money or credit transactions.
This policy is to encourage the shaping of such transactions into forms
which commercial desirability dictates. The policy is served by hold-
ing out the reward of the procedural advantages which accrue to the
ordinary holder of a negotiable instrument if the transaction be shaped
into one of the molds approved by commercial practice. These advan-
tages will follow regardless of the internal honesty of the transaction.
The second policy involves the substance of money or credit trans-
actions. Its aim is to encourage the conducting of the formal type
transactions on a basis of the utmost honesty and commercial desir-
ability, and is served by holding out the reward of the substantive ad-
vantages which accrue to the holder in due course of a negotiable instru-
ment. For these to follow there must be, in addition to the approved
formal conduct, the approved substantial conduct.
Thus the corps d'elite of the law of bills and notes has two levels
of merit with ascending strata of advantages granted to the obligee in
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order to encourage both the shaping and the conduct of money or credit
transactions in a commercially desirable manner.
The first policy, of encouraging the shaping of all money or credit
transactions into approved forms, regardless of their internal honesty,
proceeds on the premise that social and economic welfare will be fos-
tered if such transactions be carried on in the form of negotiable bills,
notes, and checks, rather than by less formal means. It is believed that
the resulting greater use of these approved types of commercial instru-
ments will, by providing substitutes for money and facile instruments
of credit,' make the most efficient use of the available supply of money
and credit and so increase the volume of business done in the marketing
of the world's goods and the use of human services.
The second policy is more concerned with the internal honesty of
the transaction which is carried on by means of the approved form of
commercial instrument. Its aim is to encourage the more commercially
desirable conduct of the good faith and innocent investment of money
or other value in future obligations. Of course, the prospect of sub-
stantive advantages will also encourage people to shape ordinary trans-
actions into the approved forms.
Implicit in both these policies is the idea not only of encouraging
the occurrence of transactions which might not happen at all save for
the bait of the advantages held out, but also of causing those trans-
actions which probably would occur in an informal manner to be con-
ducted both as to form and substance in the commercially desirable
manner.
The common purpose of the rules of law giving effect to
these policies is to detract from the position of the debtor or owner
and to grant extraordinary privileges to the creditor, lender, or in-
vestor.2 At first sight this would indicate that the rules might defeat
their own purposes by discouraging the borrowing or debtor class from
using these peculiar types of transaction. But the creditor class is
economically superior. It is able both to dictate to the debtor class
the form which the transactions shall take and to perform the acts
making for the more commercially desirable holding in due course.
Thus the grant of jural favors to the creditor group does stimulate the
greater use of these type transactions and the more frequent occurrence
of intrinsic honesty in the manner of their circulation.
i. For a discussion of whether negotiable instruments serve as substitutes for
money or instruments of credit, see Waterman, The Promissory Note as a Substitute
for Money (1930) 14 MINN. L. REv. 313.
2. There are at least two minor attributes of the law of bills and notes giving the
debtor a superior position if the transaction be a negotiable, rather than a non-negotiable
one. The obligor i* safer in making payment of a negotiable instrument, as he has the
sure proof of that fact by the taking up of the instrument. The anomalous indorser is in
a happier position on a negotiable instrument, for then he is entitled to steps of dili-
gence, whereas on a non-negotiable one he would be a co-maker and absolutely liable.
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In discussing the subject in detail the writer will attempt to use
terminology and classifications which will describe the subject matter
in terms of the "commercial policy" approach herein adopted. There
will be no attempt to solve or discuss minutely all the numerous un-
solved and debatable problems of the law which result either from the
lacunae and other imperfections of the Statute or from judicial dis-
agreement thereunder. Certain of these problems will be used, how-
ever, because of their utility in catalyzing functional discussions under
various headings and, to the extent that considerations of commercial
policy may suggest the proper solutions, these latter will be presented.
Beyond that nothing more will be done than to recognize that unsettled
problems exist.
The detailed topics will be: I. The procedural advantages re-
warding the ordinary holder; II. The substantive advantages reward-
ing the holder in due course; III. The minimum commercial conduct
creating the procedural advantages; IV. The more desirable commer-
cial conduct creating the substantive advantages; and, V. The commer-
cial conduct terminating the advantages.
I. THE PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGES REWARDING THE ORDINARY
HOLDER
The tenor of these procedural advantages is to facilitate the
holder's enforcement of the liability incidental to the instrument and
to make it more difficult for the respective obligors to escape liability
and for other persons to claim ownership of the instrument. As to
ordinary holders all of the common-law requisites of contract or trans-
fer of chose in action are necessary in order that there be created lia-
bility to or ownership in the holder.3 The absence of any fundamental
requirement of a common-law contract or transfer, or the presence of
some legal obstacle thereto, would as certainly prevent liability or title
from arising here as it would in a common-law transaction. But the
reward for shaping the transaction into the form approved by the law
of bills and notes is the benefit of a group of peculiar rules. The effect
of these rules, is to minimize the difficulty of proving the presence of
the necessary, and the absence of the objectionable features set up by
the law of contracts and property.
4
These procedural advantages fall into five groups: (A) The
minimizing of the difficulty of transfer; (B) The minimizing of the
3. NEGO'i.BLE: Ims'RUmENTs LAW, § 58. In the ensuing footnotes the various sec-
tions of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law will be referred to merely by section
number.
4. Section 5 provides that the negotiability of an instrumeit shall not be affected
by an express stipulation for certain privileges advantageous to the obligee in enforcing
the transaction.
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pleading difficulties; (C) The minimizing of the operative facts for
liability and ownership; (D) The minimizing of the evidential require-
ments to prove the operative facts; and, (E) The minimizing of the
evidential requirements to establish the more desirable status of the
holder in due course.
A. The Minimizing of the Difficulty of Transfer
Negotiability or free transferability is by far the outstanding
achievement of the peculiar law of bills and notes. The concept of the
capacity of the original and subsequent obligees to transfer their rights
to the fullest extent to anyone whom they may choose not only stands
at the apex of the procedural advantages themselves but forms the
foundation of the higher group of substantive advantages (immunity
'from personal defenses and claims of ownership, and capacity to trans-
fer such quality) which are extended to the more worthy holders in
due course.
Where the common law gave the contractual obligee few enough
privileges and would not permit him to transfer any of those, the law
of bills and notes gives to the original obligee far more privileges in
his own right, allows him to transfer all of them to another ordinary
holder, and gives any one the power of creating still greater privileges
in the hands of a holder in due course by making transfer to such a
person.5
The concept of "negotiability" or of the instrument's being a
"negotiable instrument" thus has three aspects, in only the last two of
which is the question of transfer involved. One and the same set of
operative facts, later to be treated, determines whether the instrument
is a "negotiable instrument", from the standpoint of: (i) whether the
original obligee may enforce the obligation with the aid of the peculiar
procedural advantages of the ordinary holder; (2) whether the instru-
ment is capable of being properly transferred to another ordinary holder
who may, himself, enforce it with the aid of these procedural advan-
tages; 0 and, (3) whether it is capable (if the requisite further opera-
tive facts occur) of being transferred to a holder in due course who
will receive the additional substantive advantages accruing to such an
exalted person. "Negotiability" includes all of these ideas.7 Thus the
5. §§ 57, 58.
6. On this, consider i (4) (instrument must be payable to order or bearer);
§§ 8, 9 (when so payable) ; § 34 (difference between special and blank indorsements).
7. See Smith, The Concept of "Negotiability" as Used il; Sectiolt 47 of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law (1929) 7 Tzx. L. REV. 520, dealing with the various senses of
"negotiable" and particularly with the question of the extent to which a restrictive
indorsement terminates negotiability. Consider also the narrower sense of "negotia-
tion" under § 3o, and the difference between a holder by negotiation and one owning
under § 49.
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happening of maturity will cut off "negotiability" in the third sense,
but not in the first two.8
This quality of transferability, which arises from the same oper-
ative facts which make it possible for the original obligee to enforce
the instrument by the procedural advantages, makes it possible for the
proper transferee to have the complete legal title, i. e., complete capacity
likewise to enforce the instrument through the assistance of all the
procedural advantages accruing to the original ordinary holder. This
was not so by the common law of contracts and procedure. By this
law the obligee could not even transfer the lesser privileges which ac-
crued to him. Either the concept of privity between the original parties
to the contract, or the fear of increased litigation if one person were
allowed to enforce a promise made to another was the basis of the
common-law rule that obligations were not assignable. While the
common law itself, aided by sporadic statutes, has modified this rule,
particularly by the device of the equitable assignment and the suit in
the name of the assignor on behalf of the assignee, the law of bills and
notes has long gone farther and has recognized that desirable commer-
cial practice demands that negotiable instruments should be freely trans-
ferable. It thus permits the law merchant assignee to enjoy to the
fullest all the rights and privileges of the assignor. 9
Not only are the rewards accorded the transferee for having taken
transfer to be considered privileges given him, but the possibility of
making transfer, or further transfer, must be considered as an induce-
ment to the original and subsequent holders to become such and to deal
in negotiable paper.
The concept of transfer underlies one of the two forms of nego-
tiable instrument. The bill of exchange itself involves an apparent or
attempted transfer by the drawer of the drawee's indicated obligation
to him. Implicit in the drawing of the bill is the drawer's indication
either that he believes the drawee already to be obligated to him or that
he expects the drawee to make advances on his behalf. While, for
reasons of policy later to be discussed, the law does not attach to the
drawing of the bill the consequences of an assignment even on the com-
mon-law level, yet, nevertheless, the drawing of it does simulate an
assignment to the payee or bearer of the expected performance by the
drawee.
8. Consider the last sentence of § 7 which provides that overdue paper shall be
treated as demand paper with reference to persons becoming obligated on it after
maturity.
9. Consider that one of the results of transferability, even as to an ordinary holder,
is the transferee's freedom from a claim of set-off of an obligation between the obligor
and the transferor. To this extent there is a substantive difference between the ordinary
holder and the common-law assignee.
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B. The Minimizing of the Pleading Difficulties
The next point wherein the law of bills and notes differs markedly
from the common law-and that in favor of the obligee-is in the
minimizing of the difficulties of pleading incidental to the enforce-
ment of the obligations involved in the transaction. The first instance
of this, connected with the minimizing of the difficulty of transfer,
lies in the capacity of the holder other than the original payee to sue
upon the transaction in his own name.'0
Not only may a transferee-holder sue in his own name, but every
holder, either the original payee or a proper transferee, is empowered
to bring the suit in his own name not merely upon the transaction
underlying the instrument but (with less difficulty) upon the instru-
ment itself considered as the contract, viz., as a mercantile specialty
analogous to a sealed instrument. In pleading, the underlying trans-
action is replaced by the instrument, which, for this purpose, is deemed
to represent the obligation.
This is something more than the privilege of drafting a briefer
declaration, of alleging the execution of the instrument rather than the
making of a promise, with all the subjective details possibly involved
therein. There is dispensed with the need of alleging the presence of
the requisite elements of contractual liability which the normal law of
procedure would require for a common law contract. There are said
to be four elements of a contract, legal subject matter, competent
parties, consideration, and mutual assent, which last in the case of a
written contract, is evidenced by delivery. The first two are, by the
normal law of procedure, defensive in nature, and need not be alleged
in the plaintiff's declaration. The holder of a negotiable instrument
need make no further allegations of the latter two elements of con-
sideration and delivery than by alleging that the defendant executed
the instrument.
Further, when the plaintiff suing is a remote holder, his pleading
difficulty is minimized (as contrasted with the situation obtaining under
the modified common law) by the ease with which he may allege (and
later prove) the transfer or transfers by which the instrument reached
him. Under the procedural advantages accruing to an ordinary holder,
all that needs to be done is to allege the indorsement by such persons
as, according to the tenor of the instrument, are necessary indorsers.
Should the paper have been originally bearer paper, it is sufficient to
allege its issuance, without mentioning the possibly numerous interven-
ing assignments which might have happened. If the instrument started
10. § 51. The problems raised by §§ 37 and 49 are discussed infra, notes 223, 224,
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as order paper and later by blank endorsement became and remained
bearer paper, it is necessary only to allege indorsements as far as the
first blank indorsement, after which the pleader may ignore later actual
transfers. Did the paper pass by simple assignment, it would be neces-
sary to allege in detail each contract of assignment, which is a much
more onerous task."
Tied up with the above advantages is the concept of a negotiable
instrument as not one, but several contracts, one for each of such sepa-
rate transactions as making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing. One and
the same piece of paper, by virtue of being signed at different times
and on different parts thereof, may become different contracts, enforced
by different lawsuits. Thus not only does a holder sue on the instru-
ment, but he sues the defendant in a particular capacity on the instru-
ment, and it may be important in a given case to determine what is the
capacity of the instant defenlant on the particular instrument which he
may have signed.
To settle this question of what is the capacity in which a partic-
ular signer of a given instrument should be sued, the Statute offers
further procedural advantages in numerous provisions for clearing up
ambiguities raising doubts as to the proper form of pleading. Thus if
it is doubtful whether the instrument is a bill or a note, the holder may
choose which to consider it.'2 It is also provided that a signature not
otherwise explained shall be regarded as that of an indorser, and thus
a person so signing may be sued in that capacity.13  Definite provision
is made to determine to whom an irregular indorser shall be liable.14
Indorsers are prima facie liable to one another in the order in which
they indorse. 15 Joint indorsers are considered as jointly and severally
liable,' 6 as are signers who place two or more signatures to an instru-
ment reading "I promise to pay." 17
C. The Minimizing of the Operative Facts for Liability and Ownership
The most fundamental aspect of this minimizing of essential oper-
ative facts is seen in the rule that liability on and transfer of a proper
negotiable instrument may be accomplished by nothing more (and
sometimes less) than the conduct of the obligor's or transferor's sign-
ing his name on the instrument and intentionally delivering it to the
ii. Ibid.
12. §§ i7 (s), 130.
13. §§ 17 (6), 63, 67.
14. § 64.
IS. § 68.
16. Ibid.
17. § i7 (7).
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object of his dealing.' 8 Thus, the contracts of the drawer,19 maker,20
acceptor, 2 ' and indorser, 2 all follow by legal implication from the fact
of signing one's name in the appropriate position on the instrument,
and later delivering it. It is not necessary to express the words of the
obligation, further than by the "promise or order" in the body of the
instrument.28 The maker and the acceptor, by the bare signature, ac-
complish as much as if they should write out in full: "I promise to
pay this sum at the specified date." The drawer and the indorser, like-
wise, accomplish as much as if they should say: "I promise to pay upon
the following conditions." From the transfer aspect, the act of the
holder in indorsing order paper accomplishes as much as if he had writ-
ten out a complete contract of transfer.
Then, under appropriate conditions, as we shall see, liability and
transfer may be accomplished even in the absence of signature, from
the bare fact of the delivery of the instrument, or from other recognized
conduct. Thus a drawee may be held to have constructively accepted
a bill addressed to him by virtue of his commercial misconduct with
reference to the bill, even where he has not signed his name with inten-
tion to accept.24 Then, too, one who transfers an instrument without
indorsement, or even where he does indorse, in addition to his normal
indorser's liability, acquires the liability of a warrantor from the bare
fact of transfer.25 And, it is quite possible to make an effectual trans-
fer by mere delivery, even without signature, and without expression
of the contract of assignment. If the paper be, at the time, bearer
paper, the transfer by bare delivery accomplishes a full negotiation and
creates all the procedural advantages in the transferee,26 and if it be at
the time order paper, a transfer without indorsement creates practically
equivalent procedural advantages in the transferee.
2
7
Even in situations where the signature is considered essential, occa-
sional exceptional rules permit it to be made in abnormal manner. Ex-
amples are the indorsement on a separate paper attached to the instru-
ment,28 the analogous acceptance on a separate writing,2 9 and the valid
x8. Consult § 3 (how indorsement made); § 67 (indorsement of bearer paper).
Section 16 recognizes the requirement of delivery. See also § 23 (forgery).
i9. § 61. The drawer may, however, insert a provision negativing or limiting his
liability to the holder. Ibid.
20. §6o.
21. §62.
22. §§ 66, 67.
23. § io (any terms sufficient if they indicate an intention to conform to the Stat-
ute) ; § 14 (blanks).
24. §§ 136, 137.
25. §§65, 66, 69.
26. §§ 30, 34, 40.
27. § 49.
28. §31.
29. §§ 134, 135.
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acceptance of a bill which is incomplete in many respects. 30 One may
sign through an agent 31 and, as a further minimizing of the operative
facts, the Statute makes it clear that the appointment of the agent may
be established informally.3 2 If one signs actually as agent but without
disclosing his principal, he is penalized for this commercially undesir-
able conduct by being subjected to liability himself which he could have
avoided had he indicated both his agency and the identity of his
principal.8 3
The extraordinary quality of the law of bills and notes for work-
ing liability with greater facility in favor even of the ordinary holder
is further seen when we consider the nature of the liability of the
drawer, indorser, and transferor. That of the maker and the acceptor
is, of course, analogous to that of an ordinary common-law promisor
and the law merchant does no more than to work it with unusual ease.
But on the drawer, indorser, and transferor a liability is imposed which
is more extensive than at common law.3 4  The law merchant adds to
the warranty liability of the common law the conditional secondary
liability which is imposed on certain of these parties automatically by
virtue of their assuming such capacities.
Another aspect of the minimizing of otherwise essential opera-
tive facts in favor of ordinary holders consists of the admissions which
the Statute sets up as incidental to the acts of assuming the various
types of liability. Thus the maker,3 5 drawer,3 6 and acceptor 37 "admit"
the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse, and the
indorser and transferor 3s not only make this admission but actually
may incur liability for its non-existence by their warranties that all
prior parties had capacity to contract. The acceptor also makes certain
admissions as to the drawer.3 9 Thus in suing any of these parties it is
not necessary to allege or prove the existence and contractual capacity
of the payee or of any parties prior to an indorser or transferor. Hence
certain of the operative facts otherwise essential to complete transfer
30. § 138.
31. § g.
32. Ibid.
33. § 20. Consider also § 42 concerning paper addressed to one as "Cashier" or
other fiscal officer, and § 69 concerning the warranty liability of an agent or broker who
negotiates by delivery without disclosing his principal.
34. The indorser and transferor would, of course, be common-law assignors and
subject to the warranty liability thereof. The closest analogy for the drawer under the
common law would be to an assignor and, as was pointed out earlier in the text, the
drawing of a bill does simulate an assignment although the law refuses to treat it as
such for reasons of commercial policy. §§ r27, 189. The drawee is not liable unless
and until he accepts.
35. §60.
36. § 6.
37. § 62 (2).
38. §§ 65, 66.
39. § 62 (1).
THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES
are dispensed with to the greater advantage of the ordinary holder. So
it is that the indorsement or assignment by a corporation or an infant
passes the property even though the indorser or assignor did not have
contractual capacity.40
While consideration is as much requisite in the case of an ordinary
holder as in that of the common-law obligee,41 yet certain provisions of
the Statute purport to clarify the requirement so as to avoid any doubt.
Thus, an antecedent debt is "value", 4 2 and one who holds by way of
lien holds for value.43  It is made clear that an accommodation party
may be liable even to one aware of the fact of accommodation.44  But
any statute requiring the nature of the consideration to be stated re-
mains in force.
45
Finally, an instrument need not be dated,46 nor need it specify the
value or any value,47 nor the place where drawn or payable; 48 and post-
dating or ante-dating is permitted.49  The leniency as to blank spaces
in an instrument, and the various rules for settling ambiguities, have
been referred to, and will be again.
D. The Minimizing of the Evidential Requirements to Prove the
Operative Facts
Various rules minimize the difficulty of proving those operative
facts which still are requisite as to ordinary holders. Typical rules of
this sort are the presumptions which make out a prima facie case of
the existence of the requisite operative facts from other and more easily
proven evidential facts. Thus, while consideration is required as to an
ordinary holder, the Statute presumes it for the issuance of the instru-
ment and for the signing by every party.50 Further, the necessary valid
40. § 22. Consider, however, the judicial limitation of this doctrine with respect
to the infant's assertion of a claim of ownership of the proceeds of the instrument.
Consider also § 42 on the question of transferring corporation paper.
41. §28.
42. §25.
43. §27.
44. §29.
45. §6.
46. §6 (i).
47. § 6 (2). Consider § 26 which declares that where value has at any time been
given, the holder holds for value as to all parties becoming liable prior to the value
being given.
48. §6 (3).
49. § 12.
5o. § 24. Consider also § 6 (4) which declares that negotiability shall not be
affected by the presence of a seal, and the question which has arisen thereunder: whether
(for an actually sealed instrument) the rebuttable presumption of consideration under
the statute or the common-law rule dispensing entirely with it shall prevail as to an
ordinary holder.
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delivery of the instrument by a person whose signature is on it is pre-
sumed from the fact of the instrument's being out of his possession.51
Two other procedural advantages of this sort are not found in the
Statute but are found in the case law and extrinsic legislation of many
states. One lies in the provisions to the effect that the defendant's fail-
ure to deny, by pleading, the validity of a well pleaded signature shall
be taken as a judicial admission of the genuineness of the signature.
Under these provisions it is often possible for an ordinary holder to
recover merely by filing the instrument and resting his case. Normally,
and under the uniform statute, proof of necessary signatures must be
made in order that the holder prevail. The other of these advantages
not found in the Statute is embodied in the rule permitting the use of
the notary's certificate of protest to prove the essential operative facts
of presentment and notice in order to bind secondary parties. This rule
makes it possible to dispense with the calling of human witnesses to
prove these happenings. Protest is required in order to bind secondary
parties on foreign bills, and is made permissible in order to facilitate
this essential proof in the case of inland bills and all notes.
52
A miscellaneous group of presumptions provided for by the Statute
also aid the ordinary holder in making out his case. 53 For purposes
of the rule of protest, a bill is presumed to be and may be treated as an
inland bill 54 unless the contrary is apparent. A date on an instrument
or any act thereon is presumed to be the correct date thereof. 55 Every
indorsement is presumed to have been made at the place where the in-
strument itself is dated. 56  Indorsers are liable prima facie in the order
in which they indorse. 57  Various rules 58 purport to clear up ambi-
guities in the transaction by means of presumptions, including the
rule 59 presuming an unexplained signer to be an indorser. It is pre-
sumed that an instrument payable to one as a named fiscal officer of a
bank or corporation is payable to such institution. °
5I. § 16. This must be considered, of course, in the light of § 15. The rule re-
sultant from the two Sections is that the total lack of delivery of an incomplete instru-
ment is an absolute defense, available even against a holder in due course.
52. Consider §§ 152 to i6o, inclusive, treating of the details of protest.
53. But cf. § 1:3 which presumes an apparent cancellation to have been intentional
and authorized.
54. § 129, 152.
55. § 1i. Contrast § 12 (title passes at time of actual delivery of a post-dated or
ante-dated instrument); § 136 (acceptance dates as of day of presentment) ; § 17 (2)
(interest presumed to run from date of instrument or time of issue if undated)
§ 17 (3) (where not dated, instrument considered to be dated as of time of issue).
56. § 46.
57. § 68.
8. § 17.
59. § 17 (6), 63. Consider also § 64 delimiting the liability of the irregular
indorser.
6o. §42.
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E. The Minimizing of the Evidential Requirements to Establish the
More Desirable Status of the Holder in Due Course
A decided advantage given the ordinary holder by the law is the
presumption that he is a holder in due course, viz., that he took for
value, in good faith, without notice, and before maturity, thus obtaining
the consequent substantive advantages. Thus every holder is deemed
prima facie a holder in due course, but the burden may be shifted to
him to prove that he is such when the defendant or claimant makes
preliminary proof of defective title in him as defined by the Statute,
viz., when there exists a defense or claim involving "crookedness." 61
In the latter event there is more danger that the alleged holder is a
catspaw for a thief or fraud-feasor and so it is thought better to make
the holder prove that he does hold in due course, or that a predeces-
sor did.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGES REWARDING THE HOLDER IN
DUE COURSE
Where the procedural advantages rewarding the ordinary holder
merely facilitate his recovery on the instrument under the usual require-
ments of the elements of contractual liability and transfer, the substan-
tive advantages reward the more commendable holder in due course by
dispensing entirely with some of the requirements of contractual lia-
bility, or by removing completely some of the normal obstacles to such
recovery or to the retention of the instrument. Thus the peculiarities
of the law are here substantive in nature rather than procedural.
These substantive advantages 62 which reward the more commend-
able holder in due course are primarily of two sorts, first, an immunity
from certain personal defenses which otherwise the obligor could assert
to defeat liability, and, second, an immunity from certain claims by
other persons to ownership of the instrument or its proceeds. A third
form of substantive advantage is the capacity of the holder in due
course to transfer his substantive advantages to another who is only
an ordinary holder or assignee.
The former two, which are the principal capacities constituting the
more privileged status of the holder in due course, are merely specific
examples in the law of bills and notes of a concept found sporadically
in many branches of the law, viz., the protection of the bona fide pur-
61. § 55. Consider also whether, when the burden has shifted under this Section,
the holder has the benefit of the presumption of value under § 24, and of indorsement
before maturity under § 45.
62. Section 57 sets up the immunity from defenses specifically and, along with § 58,
is the statutory source of the whole calendar of substantive advantages. Contrast the
use of the phrase "in due course" in § 88 with reference to payment, and, in a similar
connection, in § 51.
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chaser under circumstances when a balancing of the equities indicates
that the change of position of the bona fide purchaser makes it less
desirable that he bear the loss which must be borne by someone than
that it be borne by the one whose conduct has made the loss possible.
A. Immunity from Personal Defenses to Liability
While the maker of a note, for instance, may normally defend
against the payee for any reason the common law permits 11 (save that
the procedural advantages make it relatively more difficult to do so)
he will be liable to one who has taken, in the first instance or later,
as a holder in due course despite a defense, so long as the defense is
personal.64 A few of the typical common law defenses to liability may
be asserted even against a holder in due course, and so it is that an in-
vestigation of the substantive advantages of the holder in due course
calls for a demarcation of the personal defenses or equities on the one
hand from the real or absolute defenses on the other. The latter may
be asserted even against a holder in due course.
The personal defenses or equities are those which the law regards
as so insignificant that, with respect to them, it is more equitable to
make the obligor take the risk of the instrument's getting to a holder
in due course than it is to make the holder in due course take the risk
of their existence. On the other hand, the real or absolute defenses
are those so important that with respect to them it is more fair to make
the investor take the risk of their existence than it is to make the obligor
take the risk of a holding in due course. As to the real or absolute
defenses, either the policy of the law against enforcing liability is so
strong or the intention of the obligor to acquire liability is so slight (if
any there be) that the injury to the obligor if he be forced to pay is
considered to outweigh the damage to the investor in being denied the
fruits of his investment.
The solution of what defenses are "available to prior parties
among themselves," 65 i. e., what are personal defenses or equities, as
distinguished from the real or absolute defenses, is a matter of specific
statutory mandate in some instances and of judicial construction in the
others.
Thus the Statute squarely provides that among the real or absolute
defenses which may be asserted even against one otherwise a holder in
due course there shall be included the forgery of the obligor's signa-
ture, 66 any variation by way of material alteration from the original
63. § 58.
64. §s7.
65. Ibid.
66. §23.
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tenor of the instrument, 67 and the total lack of delivery of an incom-
plete instrument.6 On the other hand, judicial interpretation both
before and after the Statute has added to the calendar of real or abso-
lute defenses those of fraud in the esse contractus; (possibly) physical
duress; actual but not indicated running of the Statute of Limitations;
lack of contractual capacity; 69 and "statutory invalidity".
70
There must be excluded from the category of real or absolute
defenses certain topics which apparently are, but actually are not, real
or absolute defenses. These are all properly listed as events "terminat-
ing the advantages", i. e., discharging liability on the instrument. All
such events provide at most only personal defenses to liability although,
as it happens, some of them are of such a nature as to make it impos-
sible to have a subsequent holding in due course. In cases of the latter
type these events have the mere appearance of real defenses. Examples
of these latter are the intentional physical destruction or mutilation of
the instrument, or discharge by payment at or after maturity. Both of
these "terminate the advantages" and, along with other acts accom-
plishing that end, furnish the personal defense of that name, although
these particular ones, as it happens, are of such a nature as to preclude
a subsequent holding in due course. To the extent to which a subse-
quent holding in due course is legally possible, the discharge or avoid-
ance of the instrument by the conduct terminating the advantages fur-
nishes at most only a personal defense from which the subsequent
holder in due course is immune.
Thus the insertion of the wrong date in the date blank, which
would avoid the instrument as to an ordinary holder and terminate his
right to enforce it by the procedural advantages, does not affect the
holder in due course who may rely on the accuracy of the dating of the
instrument.71 So it is with the failure to give notice of dishonor by
non-acceptance of an instrument not necessary to be presented for ac-
ceptance. Failure of notice discharges secondary parties, i. e., termi-
nates the procedural advantages against them, but if the instrument
should come to a holder in due course who is ignorant of the present-
ment and dishonor, he may enforce their secondary liability regard-
less of their being discharged as to ordinary holders.72  On the other
hand the problem cannot arise for discharge of secondary parties by
failure to notify of dishonor by a non-acceptance upon a necessary pre-
67. §§ 124, 125.
68. §§ i5, 16.
69. Consider the problems raised by § 22, referred to herein, Mipra note 40.
7o. Incidentally applicable on this point is § 6-end (no repeal of statutes requiring
nature of consideration to be stated) ; and § 5-end (nothing to validate any provision
otherwise illegal).
71. § 13.
72. § 117.
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sentment at a definite date, because the lack of entry of the acceptance
would put the alleged holder in due course on notice of the failure.
7 3
So it is with discharge of secondary parties by failure to take proper
steps at maturity. That the instrument was taken subsequently would
negative a holding in due course as to obligations accrued before
maturity.
The prior termination of the advantages as against any party by
the proper renunciation by a prior holder is, likewise, but a personal
defense not to be asserted against a holder in due course ignorant
thereof.74  So it is with the whole calendar of material alterations of
the instrument 75 which avoid the entire instrument as to ordinary
holders, thus terminating the procedural advantages, but which, so far
as a holding in due course is subsequently possible, do not affect due
course holders. They may enforce the instrument according to its
original tenor. But to the extent of the variation from the original
tenor, an absolute defense exists.
Then, turning to the personal defenses in general, the Statute pro-
vides that the holder in due course may enforce an instrument accord-
ing to its appearance even though actually blanks have been filled in in
a manner not authorized by the obligor sought to be held.76  As to an
ordinary holder the obligor can defend on the ground that blanks have
been improperly filled in, or have been properly filled in, but after a
reasonable time has elapsed.
The two principal areas clearly established as only personal de-
fenses by the Statute itself are those of consideration and delivery,
which by themselves comprehend two of the four essential elements of
contractual liability. Where as a matter of the procedural advantages
of ordinary holders these elements are but rebuttably presumed, as to
holders in due course they are entirely dispensed with. The defense
of lack or failure of consideration cannot be set up against a holder in
due course.77  Further, one who has put his signature to a complete
instrument cannot defend against a holder in due course on the ground
that he never intentionally delivered the instrument, nor can one who
has signed an incomplete instrument and delivered it to another for any
purpose defend on the ground that such other abused his authority in
completing the instrument and negotiating it.78 As we have seen, total
lack of delivery of an incomplete instrument is a real defense.
73. Of course, this would not be so for paper payable "3o days after sight" because
on that there would be nothing to indicate, from the mere lack of an acceptance, that
there had been a presentment and a refusal.
74. § 122.
75. 99 124, 125.
76. § 14.
77. § 28.
78. §§ i5, i6.
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The Statute itself calls for judicial interpretation of the remaining
personal defenses by its provision 79 that the holder in due course, in
addition to holding free from defenses available to prior parties among
themselves, also holds free "from any defect of title of prior parties."
While this seems to comprehend claims of ownership as well, yet, when
interpreted in the light of a previous Section 80 defining "defective
title", it indicates the statutory intention to have listed under the per-
sonal defenses the facts of the obtaining of the instrument by "fraud,
duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal
consideration, or when . . . [negotiated] . . . in breach of faith, or
under such circumstances as amount to a fraud". 81  This "general wel-
fare" clause, also used in the Statute as the test for determining the
burden of proof on the issue of holding in due course, purports to
enable one to determine whether a given defense is personal or real,
i. e., whether the holder in due course is immune from it or not. The
ultimate limits of the personal defenses are defined in another Section
of the Statute providing that in the hands of a holder other than one
in due course (unless he claims under such a holder in due course) the
instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were not negotiable.
8 2
B. Immunity from Claims of Ownership of the Instrument
The next aspect of the substantive advantages accruing to the
holder in due course is the immunity from the claims of others to
ownership of the instrument. The holder in due course may retain
the instrument or its proceeds in situations where the ordinary holder
would have to surrender it or them to the rightful owner of the instru-
ment from whom it had passed without his full consent and intention.
Again the attitude of placing the loss on the one who by his conduct
made it possible is seen, here with reference to depriving one of owner-
ship.
Thus the former owner of an instrument which was already bearer
paper, or which became such by his blank indorsement, or which he
indorsed specially to one who actually secured and properly negotiated
it, takes the risk of being unable to recover it or its proceeds from a
holder in due course who has taken it from or under a finder, thief,
dishonest agent or other fraudulent negotiator, or from an apparent
transferee where the consideration for the transfer has failed.
79. § 57.
So. §55.
81. Ibid.
82. § 58. Consider the apparent intention of § 66 of the Statute to confer only on
holders in due course the benefit of the warranty liability of the unqualified indorser.
There is no limitation in § 65 which creates the warranties of the qualified indorser and
the transferor by delivery.
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But the former owners take these risks only where the instrument
contains valid signatures of all parties whose signatures are essential
for transfer. Holders in due course take the risk of the forgery of a
necessary signature. 83 To this extent, forgery might be analogized to
one of the "absolute defenses" discussed under the previous heading
of immunity from personal defenses. But a better explanation is that
when a necessary signature is forged, the possessor of the instrument
is not even an ordinary holder and so cannot hold in due course.
The principal aspects of this immunity from claims of ownership
arise usually in connection with delivery and sometimes in connection
with consideration. While, even as to an ordinary holder, an inten-
tional transfer of an already valid instrument of another may be made
by way of gift, without any consideration (by intentional delivery of
the instrument itself), yet when the transfer is made upon a considera-
tion which fails there arises in the transferor a claim to the ownership
of the instrument which he may assert against ordinary holders but not
against holders in due course.8 4 Failure of contemplated consideration
presents a claim of ownership.
Thus it would be with the failure of an expressed condition in an
indorsement.8 5  Holders subsequent to the conditional indorsee take
with notice of the condition and in the event of its non-occurrence may
have to surrender the instrument or its proceeds to the conditional in-
dorser.
An oral condition incidental to an indorsement, made valid by
the Statute 86 as to ordinary holders, and valid at common law as to
the same class despite the parol evidence rule (if a condition precedent),
will not avail as to a holder in due course who was unaware of it.
The unavailability of this particular claim of ownership is but one
of the aspects of the application of the general rule that lack of inten-
tional delivery of the instrument may not be asserted as a claim of
ownership against a holder in due course,8T where it could be asserted
against an ordinary holder. The two recognized ways of accomplish-
ing transfer under the Statute are by delivery of bearer paper and in-
dorsement and delivery of order paper. In the absence of delivery
there is no law merchant transfer and hence a claim of ownership. But
even as to ordinary holders there is a rebuttable presumption of delivery
by any person whose signature appears on the instrument. As to
83. § 23. Consider also the problem of infancy under § 22, mipra note 40, and
whether a transfer for a gambling debt may be set aside after the instrument has reached
a holder in due course.
84. §28.
85. § 39.
86. § i6.
87. §16; cf. §1 5.
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holders in due course delivery is conclusively presumed, i. e., dispensed
with. Whether the claim be that the owner claiming never delivered
at all, or delivered on an unperformed condition, or to a person for a
limited purpose which was exceeded, the holder in due course is equally
immune.18
The Statute expresses the concept of immunity from claims of
ownership by the rule that the holder in due course holds free from any
defect of title of prior parties.89 This defect is declared to exist where
the signature or the instrument itself has been obtained by fraud,
duress, force and fear, other unlawful means, or for an illegal con-
sideration, or where the instrument has been negotiated in breach of
faith or under circumstances which amount to a fraud.90 The sub-
jection of the ordinary holder to all claims of ownership is nowhere
expressly set out in the Statute, but it follows from the express rule 91
that the holder in due course is free from such claims, and from the
analogous rule 92 that the ordinary holder is subject to the same de-
fenses as if the instrument were non-negotiable.
C. Capacity to Transfer the Substantive Advantages to an Ordinary
Holder or Assignee
The third and least important of the substantive advantages which
reward the commercially commendable conduct of holding in due course
is the power of the holder in due course to transfer the substantive
advantages to one who, because he may have taken after maturity, or
without giving value, or in bad faith, or with notice, is himself only
an ordinary holder (or, even worse, a common law assignee).9a This
power is expressed conversely by the rule that an ordinary holder
"stands in the shoes" of a holder in due course if he "derives his title
through" such a person.94
An exception to the rule is made, however, in the case of one who
was himself an earlier ordinary holder or a party to the irregularity,
thus posing the question of holding in due course vel non. There would
be too much danger of a simulated holding in due course to serve the
88. The distinction of §§ 1S, 16, between complete and incomplete instruments
would seem immaterial with respect to claims of ownership, as distinguished from de-
fenses to liability, because, in the former instance the instrument would either have
been complete to begin with or been delivered to some one other than the original
obligor.
89. § 57.
go. § 55.
9. § 57.
92. § 58.
93. Section 58 merely provides that a "holder" may enjoy the substantive advan-
tages of an earlier holder in due course. The power of the common-law assignee to
share them follows from the rule that one may transfer whatever title he himself has.
94. The first quotation is merely the cant phrase for the matter; the second comes
from § 58.
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ends of a fraud-feasor if it were possible for the party to the fraud or
an earlier ordinary holder later to occupy a higher position other than
in his own right.
The privilege of making such a transfer is to be explained in terms
of rewarding the holder in due course who transfers rather than the
ordinary holder or assignee who receives. There is nothing unusually
commendable in such conduct in receiving. Rather the transferee is
granted the substantive advantages already acquired by his transferor
because this is necessary in order that the transferor may enjoy to the
utmost those advantages granted him as a reward for his admittedly
commendable conduct in becoming a holder in due course. Granting
the substantive advantages to the lowly ordinary holder or assignee is
a means to the end of completely rewarding the exalted holder in due
course who, to be properly rewarded, must be allowed not only to
enjoy the immunity from personal defenses and claims of ownership
himself, but also to sell or give this quality to another to enjoy in his
stead, in order to liquidate his investment.
Just as the prospect of being able to make transfer is inducement
to becoming an ordinary holder, so is the possibility of conveying the
other substantive advantages bait for performing the more commend-
able conduct of becoming a holder in due course. For that matter, this
privilege is nothing beyond that of being able to transfer whatever
title one has, which even the ordinary contract law has come to recog-
nize. The law is indifferent as to whether it is rewarding the present
holder directly for his own commendable conduct or rewarding the
earlier holder who is really entitled to reward for his commercial con-
duct. This idea of "standing in the shoes" of a holder in due course
has its analogy in the provisions of the Statute 95 which create legal
title in the instrument in one who is a transferee without indorsement
from an ordinary holder of order paper. Here, too, one may reap the
advantages (here procedural) accrued to another without himself per-
forming equally desirable conduct.
III. THE MINIMUm COMMERCIAL CONDUCT CREATING THE
PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGES
The procedural advantages of the ordinary holder are granted
only in the case of -transactions complying with established ideas of
the commercially desirable transaction involving the payment of money.
The Statute has numerous provisions which serve to delimit the type
of transaction which shall be governed by these peculiar rules. These
provisions determine, first as to the initial parties, what are the opera-
95. § 49.
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tive facts the presence or absence of which shall be necessary for the
existence of a negotiable bill or note to which these procedural advan-
tages attach, and second what conduct subsequently creates such advan-
tages both for and against later parties.
The first aspect of these rules is the trend of the law to be not so
particular in its demands concerning the operative facts necessary to
secure the reward of the procedural advantages as it is with the facts
necessary to achieve the substantive advantages of a holder in due
course. Thus certain omissions and inconsistencies do not interfere
with the instrument's being sufficiently complete and regular to give
rise to the procedural advantages, although these shortcomings can
render the instrument so incomplete and irregular on its face as, of
their own force, to preclude its being held in due course. " This differ-
ence, however, would seem to follow from the initial premise of the
two levels of advantages resulting from the different levels of com-
mercial desirability in particular transactions. Not only must the sur-
rounding circumstances of the taking by the holder in due course be of
a higher nature in order for him to secure the substantive advantages,
but the instrument itself must be more perfect in form.
An analogous difference in the relative strictness as to the oper-
ative facts necessary to bring into play the rules of bills and notes is
seen in the distinction drawn between the commercial conduct neces-
sary to create the procedural advantages for and against the original
parties to the instrument at the time of its making, and that necessary
to create them for and against additional and later parties, who come
into the picture after the issuance of the instrument. In some respects
the law is more particular about the internal nature of the operative
facts which must appear on the instrument at its inception than it is
about comparable transactions entered into later by transferors or ac-
ceptors. Thus the face of the instrument must contain words of nego-
tiability 97 indicating an intention of the original parties that the in-
strument shall be freely transferable, while the indorsements on the
back need not contain such words to carry the quality further.98 In
fact, subsequent indorsers may specifically restrict such quality by re-
strictive indorsements.99  Thus, also, a condition on the face of the
instrument will destroy negotiability 100 while a conditional indorse-
ment will not; and the Statute sets forth the legal incidents resulting
from such an indorsement. 10 1 An indorsement may be "qualified" so
96. §52 ().
97. §1 (4)-
98. § 36-end.
99. Section 36 outlines what indorsements are restrictive.
1o. §§ i (2), 3, 4-end.
oi. § 39.
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as to negative liability 102 while a qualifying provision on the face of
the instrument (save as to the drawer)10 3 would defeat negotiability.
Acceptances may be 104 "qualified" by terms which would be fatal to
negotiability if found on the face of the instrument. In limited cir-
cumstances transfer or subsequent lfability can be achieved by writings
not a part of the instrument, or by conduct alone, whereas the initial
liability (and right to the procedural advantages) must be accomplished
by a writing on the instrument itself.
But these differences are consonant with sound commercial policy.
It is a sufficient carrying out of the policy of encouraging the circula-
tion of commercial paper if paper when first it gets into circulation
comes up to the minimum standard. Subsequent hampering of its cir-
culation by the departures mentioned above does not detract from the
fact that the parties are using the approved type of commercial instru-
ment for their transaction. This is the desideratum of the procedural
advantages. Qualities which, did they concern the main transaction,
would defeat the purpose of the law, may safely be tolerated in inciden-
tal dealings, so long as the main transaction is above suspicion of com-
mercial undesirability.
It must be remembered that at this stage we are talking about those
operative facts serving to raise the peculiar procedural advantages of
the law of bills and notes. As we have seen, other operative facts ger-
mane to the common law of contracts are requisite in the establishment
of a bill or note as a valid instrument. These others are, however, taken
for granted at this point. Certain of the procedural advantages may
serve to minimize them or the proof of their existence, and the substan-
tive advantages may make them unnecessary as to holders in due course.
A. The Initial Operative Facts Creating the Procedural Advantages
Against and in Favor of the Original Parties
The necessary initial operative facts fall into two classes: first,
facts showing an intention of the original parties to create a transaction
which shall be governed by the peculiar rules of the law of bills and
notes; and, second, facts indicating with certainty the details of the
performance of the transaction, to the end that the transaction shall be
internally commercially desirable. 10 5 The desire of the parties to sub-
ject the transaction to the rules of the law merchant alone will not
102. § 38.
IO3. § 61.
104. §§ 139, 140, 141.
105. Section i states the general requirements as to the form of a negotiable instru-
ment; § r26 repeats them in defining a bill of exchange; § 184 does likewise in defining
a note; and § 185 defines a check as a species of bill, drawn on a bank, and payable on
demand.
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suffice unless, further, a transaction is created acceptable to that body
of law.
i. Manifested Intention of the Original Parties to Create a Negotiable
Instrument
The original parties must manifest an intention that the trans-
action shall be subject to the peculiar rules of the law of bills and
notes. 100 Thus it is that they must both shape the transaction into one
of the two forms therein recognized 107 and, by appropriate words,
indicate that they expect the transaction to be freely transferable in
the fashion recognized by that body of rules.'08
The first element is taken care of by the statutory requirement that
the instrument must contain either an order or a promise. 10 9 These
are the respective components of the bill and the note. The bank
check, of course, must be recognized as a third definite type of nego-
tiable instrument although, legally speaking, it is a species of bill. The
second element, the original parties' expectation of free transferability,
is covered by the statutory requirement that the instrument must read
either to order or to bearer. 10 Once the original parties have indi-
cated such an expectation, later parties are held to indicate a similar
intention, (unless they specify to the contrary) by their mere dealing
with the instrument and are not required expressly to manifest any
intention that this quality of transferability shall continue."'-
2. Certainty as to the Details of Performance of the Transaction "1
2
Not only must the parties properly indicate an intention that the
transaction shall be governed by the rules of the law of bills and notes,
but, before these rules will apply, the transaction must possess internally
such commercial desirability as to entitle it to the rewards held out by
io6. Section io provides: "The instrument need not follow the language of this
act, but any tertns are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the
requirements hereof."
io7. See § 87 for an example of how one and the same instrument may be both a
bill and a note. Under that, a note payable at a bank is an equivalent to an order on
the bank to pay it for the account of the principal debtor. Distinguish, of course, the
problem of an ambiguous instrument which may be treated either as a bill or a note
under § 17 (5) and 130.
io8. I. e. by "negotiation" as defined in § 3o.
1o9. §1 (2), 126, 184.
11O. §1 I (4), i26, 184. Consider also §§ 8, 9 and 3o.
i1i. § 36-end. Consider also § 35 with reference to converting a blank indorsement
into a special one.
12. In PARSONS, NozEs AND BiLLs (865) 30, the author sub-divides the problem
of certainty with reference to (i) the payee; (2) the payor; (3) the amount; (4) the
time of payment; and, (5) the fact of payment. Concerning this, he says: "It will be
seen that the law endeavors to enforce, define, and protect all of these certainties as far
as possible. Not, however, in such an exact and technical way as would only embar-
rass the transaction of business; but substantially, and in a perfectly practical way."
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that body of law. The essential requirement in this respect is certainty
as to the details of performance of the transaction.
The Statute has required certainty in five respects: (a) as to the
expression of the terms of performance; (b) as to the nature and ex-
tent of performance; (c) as to the time of performance; (d) as to
the happening of performance; and (e) as to the identity of the per-
formers. These elements of certainty will presently be discussed in
that order. The Statute expresses these in terms of legal certainty but,
to avoid unfortunate results in situations wherein legal and commercial
certainty are not the same thing, has provided numerous (but not suffi-
cient) exceptions which allow of details in transactions which, under
the general statement, might be held to violate legal certainty. The
courts have also worked out other exceptions. There are still situa-
tions where, for lack of statutory exceptions and because the courts
have refused to make further ones, certain details of transactions have
been held to impair negotiability which do not render the transaction
uncertain from a commercial standpoint.
(a) Certainty as to the Expression of the Terms of Performance
The instrument must be in writing and signed.' 18  Nothing but
a writing is capable of that free transferability and concentration of
obligation into tangible form which the law of bills and notes demands.
Non-written transactions do not create the commercially desirable con-
sequences which are expected to flow from the greater use of bills, notes,
and checks."14 Further, the writing must be signed by the obligors to
be bound. With certain minor exceptions 115 the procedural advan-
tages of the law merchant cannot be used to enforce liability against
any person whose nime does not appear on the instrument itself."16
If there be a writing and signature, the law is not overly strict
about the manner of the writing 117 nor about the place or technique
of the signature, as commercial desirability flows from the fact of
writing and signature howsoever and wheresoever. Nor must all the
details of the instrument be complete and on the instrument at its incep-
tion. The law of bills and notes is very tolerant of blanks in the instru-
ment, so much so that a negotiable instrument will result where one
signs a blank piece of paper with the intention that a negotiable instru-
113. §§ i (i), 126, '14
114. Contrast the rules concerning the requirement of writing for the acceptance,
§§ 132 to 135, inclusive; and for the indorsement, § 31.
ii. §§49, 6s, 69, 137.
116. Consider § 23, dealing with forgery; and §§ i8, i9, 2o and 21, concerning
agency.
117. Section r7 (4) provides that the written provisions shall prevail over the
printed in the event of a conflict. Section 17 (i) provides that the words shall prevail
over the figures in the event of an inconsistency.
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ment be written above the signature. He will be liable to ordinary
holders if the instrument be filled in within a reasonable time in accord-
ance with authority, and to holders in due course regardless. The same
follows for less extensive blanks.1n
While this laxness with respect to blanks may seem to violate com-
mercial desirability in the abstract, yet two considerations suggest that
it is desirable to extend the procedural advantages to instruments thus
incomplete in their inception. One is the commercial demand for per-
mission thus to issue instruments capable of being shaped to fit unantici-
pated situations. The other is the realization that when such activity
occurs, money transactions have actually been shaped into the molds
approved by the commercial law, and the general objective-the greater
use of bills, notes, and checks-has actually been attained.
No set phrases are essential to the creation of a bill or a note.119
So long as there is an order or a promise, howsoever expressed, it is
possible for an otherwise acceptable instrument to reap the reward of
the procedural advantages. Finally, the Statute expressly dispenses
with the expression of the elements of date, place where drawn or pay-
able, and value given, and provides that the presence of a seal shall not
impair negotiability.
12 0
(b) Certainty as to the Nature and Extent of Performance
Commercial certainty as to the nature and extent of performance
follows when the order or promise is to pay a sum certain in money 121
and to do nothing else. A promise or order to pay an uncertain sum
of money, or to do any act other than the paying of money ' 2 2 is
thought not to be of the sort desirable of being stimulated by favorable
rules of law. The instrument must be for the payment of money, 23
in a sum certain,'2 4 and cannot contain any promise to perform any
act other than the payment of money, even though it be only in addition
to a subsisting term involving money. The requirement of "money"
as such has raised questions concerning the negotiability of instruments
payable in non-legal tender money and in money of a foreign country.
ii8. §§ 13, 14. Contrast the blank indorsement under §§ 34, 35 and 64.
i1g. § io. Section 17 provides rules for clearing up ambiguities. Section 43 pro-
vides that where a payee's or indorsee's name is misspelled the indorsement should be
in that name and, as well, in the proper name. Section 63 presumes a signer to be an
indorser unless otherwise indicated.
I20. § 6.
121. §§ i (2), x26, 184.
122. § 5.
123. Contrast the similar rule that an acceptance cannot specify for performance
other than by the payment of money, § 132; although it may be qualified so as to call
for payment less than the face sum, § 141 (2) ; or at a particular place, § 141 (3).
x24. Section § 17 (I) provides for the situation where there is a discrepancy on the
face of the instrument between the expression of the sum in the figures and in the
words.
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The Statute has specific provision for the validity of the former,
12 5
but the solution of the latter problem is in grave doubt.
So important is this requirement of certainty as to the nature and
extent of performance that it is provided that there shall be a discharge
of the instrument because of a material alteration if there be any change
in the sum payable,126 the medium of currency,' 27 or the place of pay-
ment; 128 or the addition of a place of payment if none be specified.'12
The statutory exceptions 130 to the prohibition against provisions
for the performance of acts in addition to the payment of money merely
make it clear that waiver of the benefit of laws favorable to the obligor
or the authorization of a confessed judgment or of the sale of collateral
securities shall not be construed as promises to perform additional acts.
Obviously these provisions do not detract from the commercial desir-
ability of such an instrument. Rather they add to it.' 3 ' The further
exception 132 validating a provision giving the holder an option to de-
mand something in lieu of the payment of money also clears up a situ-
ation not violative of the spirit of the general rule forbidding additional
promises. Commercial certainty as to the medium of performance is
satisfied if the investor can demand the payment of money. It does
not detract from the desirability of the instrument that it contains, in
effect, a separate common law agreement whereby the maker agrees to
sell some chattel or perform some service for the agreed price of the
face amount of the instrument. This exception provides for the com-
mercially desirable transaction of the convertible bond, and thus fosters
an approved method of business financing. Numerical certainty in the
amount of money involved in performance is also subject to certain
exceptions for items which could, otherwise, be strictly construed as
being uncertain. Thus the commercially desirable elements of interest,
instalment payments, provisions for exchange, and for collection costs
may safely be incorporated without defeating the negotiability of the
instrument.13 3  These terms also add to, rather than detract from, the
commercial desirability of the instrument.
(c) Certainty as to the Time of Performance
The legal rules which give effect to the law's demand that the
instrument shall be certain as to the time of performance possess less
125. § 6 (5).
126. § 125 (2).
127. § 125 (s).
128. § 125 (3).
i29. § i25-end.
130. § 5, parts 1, 2 and 3.
131. It would be peculiar if the express provision for advantages to the holder in
enforcing the obligation should be held to deprive him of those the law confers upon
him for becoming a holder.
132. § 5 (4).
133. §:; see also § i7 (2).
THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES
rationality than those just discussed. The basic rule is that the instru-
ment must be payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable future
time.134  Thus it is not always required that the time of performance
be certain. Demand paper, 35 which is expressly authorized, is the
most uncertain type of paper, leaving the payor in the dark as to when
he may be called upon to pay. In view of the general policy of favor-
ing the investor at the expense of the debtor, it would seem that com-
mercial desirability with respect to certainty in the time of performance
would be satisfied if, in any type of paper, the investor could be certain
just how long his investment would last and could be free from unex-
pected tender by the payor which would deprive him of his interest and
right to court costs incident to suit. But, save in the case of paper
stated outright to be demand paper,' 3 6 it is the policy of the law that
there must be as much certainty for the debtor as for the creditor and
that an instrument which is uncertain as to time other than by being
demand paper is non-negotiable.
An apparent exception to this is "anticipation" paper, by which
the debtor at his option may make advance payment before a definite
due date.13' This type of transaction is considered to be commercially
desirable because it enables the investor to know the ultimate date on
which he can collect, and the debtor to know the ultimate date on which
he must pay. The only departure from certainty lies in the fact that
the investor may have either to reinvest his money or to lose the inter-
est for the balance of the period after the debtor has exercised his
option to anticipate.
Paper payable on an uncertain contingency is obviously uncertain
both as to the time of performance and the occurrence of performance
and, for that reason, is non-negotiable. 38  The Statute relaxes this
rule slightly by allowing time paper to be made payable on the happen-
ing of an event which is bound to happen, even though the time of
occurrence is uncertain.130 This must be treated as a frank statutory
departure from the principle of commercial certainty as to time of per-
formance, for the paper here in question is commercially undesirable.
The statutory exception for instalment payments and for accelerability
of the due date upon default in any one instalment 140 is a commercially
desirable term which might be held to violate the general legal rule for
certainty in time of performance.
134. §§ I (3), 126, 184; § 25 mentions the distinction.
r35. See § 53 (when demand paper is overdue for holding in due course); § 71
(when presentment of demand paper must be made).
136. §§ 4, 7.
137. §4 (2).
138. § 4-end.
139. § 4 (3).
140. §§ 2 (2), 2 (3).
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Perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of the law of bills and notes
in this respect is the attitude of the law toward acceleration clauses
generally. While the Statute expressly recognizes the negotiability of
demand paper, and of time paper which is either payable at a specified
day or at the expiration of a specified period after date or sight,141 the
attitude of the courts thereunder has been that paper is rendered non-
negotiable because of uncertainty in time if it be made payable at a
fixed or determinable day, or sooner, at the unbridled option of the
holder. In substance, of course, such an instrument is nothing more
than demand paper with an ultimate fixed due date. But apparently
the courts have adhered to the doctrine that in order that demand paper
be negotiable the instrument must state the "demand" quality outright
and not indirectly by granting permission to accelerate time paper. On
the other hand, the courts have been prone to uphold the negotiability
of paper accelerable by the holder on the happening of a so-called "ob-
jective event". While at first this type of paper would seem more un-
certain than that type which the law upholds under another name-
"demand"-still, there seems to be a good analogy here to the rule ap-
plicable where there is a contingency mentioned which is certain of oc-
currence.
The strongest argument against holding that acceleration clauses
defeat negotiability is that the rule as now applied leads to quibbling
about what is an objective event and what is the whim or caprice of
the holder.
A further detail of the element of certainty in time is that con-
cerning the dating of the instrument. The law of bills and notes is
peculiarly indifferent to the dating, probably because of a recognition
either of the indifference in commercial practice to the accuracy or
presence of a date, or of the custom of writing and dating the instru-
ment on one day and making actual delivery on another. The Statute,
in this vein, provides that it is not necessary that the instrument shall
be dated,' 42 and that if there be no date the instrument shall count as
of the actual date of its issue; 143 that where the presence of the initial
date or date of acceptance is essential to fix the exact date of maturity
of an instrument running for a certain period from issue or present-
ment for acceptance the holder may cure the omission by the insertion
of the true date; 144 that a date actually inserted at the time of any
operative signature shall be presumed to be the true date; '4' and that
4'. §4 (I).
142. §6 ().
143. § 17 (3).
144. § 13. Contrast § 141 (4) (acceptance may be qualified as to time).
145. § 11.
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ante-dating or post-dating shall not affect the validity of the instrument
unless done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose.
1 46
The importance of certainty in time is to be seen in the rule that
alterations of the instrument with respect to the time of performance
are material,'147 and in the rules aiding in the determination of the exact
due date in doubtful situations.
148
(d) Certainty as to the Happening of Performance
No conditions may be attached to the requisite order or promise.'
49
Paper which on its face indicates an uncertainty as to the happening of
the performance of the obligation does not have that commercial desir-
ability which calls into play the peculiar rules under discussion.150 The
determination of what constitutes an objectionable condition on the face
of the instrument has given rise to no little quibbling. The problem is
connected with that of certainty in time. An instrument payable on
the happening of a contingency is not negotiable 151 and the happening
of the contingency does not cure it. There is uncertainty then both as
to the time of performance and the happening thereof.
Two types of term typically found in certain kinds of instruments
raise questions of this obstacle to negotiability. One is the indication
by words of the fund or account to be charged, and the other is the
notation on the instrument of the underlying transaction for the satis-
faction of which the instrument is issued. For the former the Statute
provides a complementary set of standards. If payment is to be made
"out of a particular fund", negotiability is destroyed, 152 but if the term
is merely "an indication of a particular fund out of which reimburse-
ment is to be made; or a particular account to be debited with the
amount", 15 3 negotiability is not impaired.
In the case of the notation of the transaction in which the instru-
ment is used, the Statute has more clearly settled the issue in favor of
negotiability. A "statement of the transaction which gives rise to the
instrument" 154 is specified not to impair negotiability. In order that
the instrument be held non-negotiable because of the presence of a
condition, there must be contained in the instrument a statement specifi-
146. § 12.
147. Section 125 (I) (change of date); 1 I25 (3) (change of time of payment).
148. Section 85 (days of grace abolished, provisions for instruments falling due on
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) ; § 86 (how running of time computed).
149. § i (2), 126, 184.
i5o. But indorsements may be conditional, § 39; as may acceptances, § 141.
15t. § 4-end.
152. § 3-end.
153. 3 ().
i54. § 3 (2). Section 6 (2) makes it clear that it is not necessary to state the
value for which the instrument is given, although § 6-end provides that any local stat-
utes requiring the nature of the consideration to be stated in the instrument shall remain
in force.
69o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
cally conditioning the performance 155 of the promise or order on the
carrying out of the underlying transaction.
(e) Certainty as to the Identity of the Performers 156
The parties who are expected to perform must be named on the
instrument by the intentional affixing of their signatures or names.
157
In the absence of such naming, no liability under the law of bills and
notes can accrue. Where such parties, viz., a maker on a note and a
drawer and drawee on a bill, are lacking, there can be no negotiable
instrument, although the law is lax in this respect and will permit a
defective bill to be treated as a note where there are not enough parties
for the former but there are for the latter.'58 If signatures do appear
on an instrument, liability is apparently intended, and that of the sort
indicated by the location of the signature, or the juxtaposition of appro-
priate words, or by indicative words appended to the signature. Where,
for lack of any of these circumstances, it is ambiguous as to the capacity
intended by the signer, whether maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser,
the law solves the dilemma by an arbitrary presumption 15 that the
party intended to be an indorser. In the case of the bill of exchange,
the law further requires, in order that there be a valid and complete
bill, that the drawee be named or otherwise indicated with reasonable
certainty in the original bill, 160 and forbids the addressing of a bill to
two or more drawees in the alternative or in succession, although the
instrument may be addressed to two or more jointly.' 6 1
From the angle of certainty in the parties who are to receive per-
formance the law is not so particular. It is not required that the bene-
ficiaries of performance be denoted with exactness in the origin of the
bill or note. But this is an aspect of the tendency of the law to favor
the investor rather than the debtor. It is far more important that the
investor know who his debtor is than that the debtor should know
the identity of his creditor. For an investor to take paper in ignorance
of the identity of his debtor would be to engage in a commercially
undesirable transaction and one lacking the superior qualities essential
to the extension of the procedural advantages. But there is no
analogous undesirability in the debtor's agreeing to be liable to one who
is in the beginning unknown to him. So it is that the paper may be
155. One of the most difficult problems arising under the Statute is that of the
negotiability of mortgage notes. Consider § 5 (I), making it clear that it does not
defeat negotiability to authorize the sale of collateral security.
156. Contrast § 125 (4), making it a material alteration to change the number or
relations of the parties.
157. §§ (), i8, 126, 184.
158. § 17 (5).
i59. §§ 17 (6), 63, 64.
16o. § 1 (5).
16I. § 128.
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and, in fact, must be 102 made payable to either an unknown and un-
indicated bearer,163 or to the order of a specified person or persons 164
who may,' 6 5 in turn, order its payment either to another originally un-
known person, or to the larger group of unknown "bearers". The net
result is that practically any denoting of the payee by any name what-
soever results in the paper being either bearer or order paper. If a
blank space be left for the payee's name, this may be filled in in any
approved fashion,166 and the only situation in which paper is defective
for lack of some indication of the original payee is where there is
neither blank space nor some name, artificial or natural, in the normal
place for the payee's name. Further, even where the intention is tem-
porarily to limit the beneficiary of performance to one person, a mis-
description of that person, is, by the Statute, made unimportant.16 7 The
paper may, in fact, be made payable in the first instance to the maker
or drawer himself,168 or to the drawee, 169 in which event it acquires
completeness when indorsed.170 When, in a bill, drawer and drawee
are the same, the holder may elect to regard it as a bill or a note. 1 1
B. The Subsequent Operative Facts Creating the Procedural Advan-
tages Against Additional Parties-Liability by Acceptance, In-
dorsement, or Transfer Without Indorsement 172
Now we shall treat of those additional operative facts which may
be, but need not be, on the instrument in order that there be created
the procedural advantages as against persons other than the maker or
the drawer. These consist in acceptance or certification by the drawee
of a bill or check and in indorsement or other transfer by anyone of
a bill, a check, or a note. The requirement common to both is the
same as where it is a question of the liability of the drawer or maker,
viz., that no person is subject to be proceeded against with the aid of
the procedural advantages, unless his signature is obtained 173 although,
of course, the signature may be appended by an agent acting with au-
162. §1 (4).
163. Section 9 determines when an instrument is payable to bearer.
164. Section 8 determines when an instrument is payable to order; § 41 treats of the
problem of who must indorse when the instrument is made payable to or is indorsed to
two or more persons.
i65. § 34.
i66. § 14.
167. § 43. Contrast § 42.
i68. § 8 (2).
169. § 8 (3).
17o. This is expressly provided as to notes in § 184. There is no equivalent pro-
vision as to checks in § 126, although the two sections are otherwise parallel.
171. § 130.
172. Consider the sections of the Statute on acceptance and payment for honor, not
otherwise treated herein, §§ 161 to 177, inclusive.
173. 88 i8, 23, 132.
692 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
thority,17 4 or liability may be imposed without a signature as a penalty
for commercially undesirable conduct, 175 or by operation of law for
sound reasons of policy as in the case of the warranty liability.
By acceptance the drawee assents to the order of the drawer 176
and thereby adds his liability to the instrument, which is then capable
of being enforced against him through the procedural advantages which
accrue to an ordinary holder. The certification of a check is the
equivalent of an acceptance.. 7 7  No doubt because of the usual in-
formality of commercial practice in this respect, the Statute is indiffer-
ent about the time of acceptance and the then completeness of the in-
strument. It recognizes acceptance before the drawer has signed, or
when the bill is overdue, or incomplete, or after a previous refusal of
acceptance or payment."t None of these factors is thought to detract
from the commercial desirability of the transaction.
On the other hand, commercial desirability seems to demand strict-
ness in the matter of who may accept. If a would-be bill lacks a suffi-
ciently well indicated drawee,i 79 it is no bill in the first place, and, fur-
ther, if one attempts to accept a bill addressed either to no one, or to
another, the transaction is too informal to raise the procedural advan-
tages incident to the properly created liability of an acceptor. The
acceptance must be by the named drawee, and if one attempts to "ac-
cept" a bill addressed to another, or to no one, while he may acquire
the implied liability of the maker of a note, or of the indorser of an
instrument,8 0 he does not become the acceptor of a bill subject to the
procedural advantages incident thereto. The transaction then lacks the
commercial desirability which can create that status.
Save in the case of the one who "constructively" accepts by his
misconduct with the bill, no one can be held liable as an acceptor-even
if he be the named drawee-who has not affixed his signature either
to the bill as such, or, within the narrow exceptions therefor, to another
piece of paper. The rule that a drawee cannot be sued until he either
accepts or certifies is also expressed as the rule that a check 181 or a
bill 182 does not act as an assignment. This rule, based as it is on the
common law's rejection of a "split assignment", has its justification in
considerations of commercial expediency. Bills, and particularly
checks, are rarely for the exact amount which the drawee owes
174. § ig; see also §§ 20, 21.
175. §§ 49, 137.
176. § 132.
I77. § 187.
178. § 138. Contrast § 64 (liability of irregular indorser).
179. § 1 (s).
18o. §§ i7 (6), 63.
18i. § i89.
182. § 127.
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the drawer or has agreed to stand ready to advance. To allow the
holder to acquire a right of action in all cases, possibly on an analogy
to the third party beneficiary, merely by observing the routine of com-
mon-law assignments, might subject the drawee to the unanticipated
intolerable inconvenience of frequent suits. It is better to leave the
question of whether the drawee should have honored the order to be
settled between drawer and drawee than to let it be litigated by a
stranger to their dealings. The Statute does not entirely forbid the
bill or check to be treated as an assignment, but rather stipulates that
they of their own force shall not attain that status. Extrinsic consider-
ations may show that it was the intention of the parties that there be
an assignment which, if proven, will be given that force.' 83
The "constructive" acceptance is one instance of where one can be
held liable as an acceptor without signing his name. As a penalty for
the commercial misconduct of the drawee's destroying the bill or refus-
ing to return it after it has been left with him for the purpose of allow-
ing him to make up his mind whether to accept, the law imposes on
him the same liability as if he had accepted.'8 4
In accordance with the policy of requiring certainty in the expres-
sion of the terms of performance, the normal requirement is that the
acceptance be written, and preferably on the instrument rather than
somewhere else.18 5  But there are two exceptions to this latter rule
which recognize typical commercially desirable transactions wherein it
is inexpedient that the acceptance be written on the instrument. The
one is the provision for the written promise to accept, made in advance
of the drawing of the bill,'8 6 and the other is the provision for an actual
acceptance on another piece of paper after the utterance of the bill.' 8 7
The former provides for the "letter of credit" situation and the latter
for the situation wherein the drawer finds it necessary to raise funds
quickly in a place distant from that of the drawee, who may accept by
telegram.
In accordance with the policy of certainty in the medium of per-
formance the acceptance must be for the payment of money and noth-
ing else.' 88 But it is not required that the acceptance be in exact accord
183. Although, of course, the fact that the extrinsic considerations may rest entirely
on the conduct of the drawer would seem to indicate that the convenience of the drawee
is not the rationale of the rule. Suggestions have been made that the fact that the check
or bill is for the exact balance on deposit with the drawee shows an intention to make
an assignment. This would not depart from the idea of the convenience of the drawee
because, then, there is but one item to be dealt with and no danger of a "split assign-
ment." The writer is informed that some banks automatically close out a checking ac-
count when a check for the exact balance is honored.
184. §§ 136, 137.
185. §§ 132, 133.
186. § 135.
187. § 134.
x88. § 132.
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with the tenor of the order addressed to the drawee. It is felt that
commercial desirability should permit the drawee to depart from the
limits of the order addressed by the drawer so long as his contract is
itself commercially certain. This is in accordance with the policy of
the law of bills and notes to be less strict with the incidental transaction
involving the instrument than with the original tenor thereof. Thus an
acceptance -may be qualified 189 although the holder's taking of the
qualified acceptance has its incidental effect on the liability of secondary
parties, later to be discussed.190 The drawee may, if the holder be
willing, accept on condition generally, or on condition that he will pay
part only of the amount, or at a particular place or time. Further, less
than all the drawees may accept.191 These departures in themselves
icontain no commercially undesirable elements and the only suspicion
attached to the desirability of the transaction is that there is a departure
from the original tenor of the instiument.
The other type of operative facts which have the effect of adding
new liability to an instrument which is otherwise already complete is
that involved where an instrument is indorsed or transferred. While
there are various classifications of indorsers, yet, from the standpoint
of the relation of the indorser to the instrument at the time of indors-
ing, it may be said that an unqualified indorsement may be one of three
kinds, in the event of anyone of which the indorser acquires the inchoate
secondary liability later to be discussed. The indorser may be the so-
called anomalous indorser (probably for accommodation) who was not,
when he indorsed, the holder of the instrument; 192 he may be one who
was at the time the holder of paper which, because it was then bearer
paper, did not require his signature for effective transfer, and who ac-
complished only liability (and a record) by his signing; 1'3 and finally,
he may be one who was the holder of paper which, because it was then
payable to his order, required his signature for the accomplishment of
complete transfer, the signing then accomplishing both complete trans-
fer and liability.' 9 4  In any event, the operative facts are exactly the
same, to wit, the signature of the alleged indorser accompanied by the
presumed 19r common-law requirement of delivery-which latter by
itself accomplishes complete transfer and some liability 196 in the case
of bearer paper. Any unexplained signature on the paper is presumed
189. § 139.
190. § I42.
19r . §§ 140, 41.
192. Section 64 applies to such an indorser "before delivery". See also § 63.
193. § 67. Consider § 40 to the effect that one indorsing specially on bearer paper
is liable only to those who make title through his indorsement.
r94. § 66.
195. § 16.
196. § 65.
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to be that of an indorser. 197 This provision provides well for the first
two classes of indorser, as outlined above.
Presumptions aid in solving the question of the order of liability
of numerous indorsers who may appear on the back of the instru-
ment 1.9 and as well help solve questions of the time and place of the
indorsement.190 But the policy of commercial desirability, in both the
liability and the transfer aspects of indorsement, is satisfied by nothing
more than the signature of the party sought to be bound or whose
signature is essential to transfer.20 0 Thus is recognized the commercial
custom of relying on the signature alone for these purposes. The in-
dorsement not only serves as a vehicle of liability and transfer but also
serves as a receipt signed by the indorser and as a record of the travels
of the instrument. That the indorsement can be demanded for these
latter commercially desirable purposes, or that one whose signature is
essential for transfer may append his name without incurring full lia-
bility 201 (whereby squeamish holders will be encouraged to transfer),
provision is made for the so-called qualified indorsement-"without re-
course"-which does, if needed, accomplish transfer and does not de-
feat negotiability or the possibility of a holding in due course but pre-
cludes the full liability aspect of indorsement. 202  Somewhat the same
result is incidentally accomplished by the restrictive and conditional
indorsements. 20 3 There is no objection to the writing of special guar-
anties by additional parties on bills and notes, but inasmuch as the
signature thereto alone accomplishes as much as the typical guaranty,
it is difficult to conceive of such common law obligations on negotiable
instruments presenting problems. Suffice it to say again that once the
procedural advantages have come into being as to the original parties
the same advantages are available against any others who for what-
ever purpose, necessary or otherwise, have intentionally affixed their
names to the instrument.
The normal liability which flows from the fact of indorsement is
the so-called "secondary" liability (akin to that of the drawer), which
is a liability to pay the face of the instrument upon the conditions of
presentment, demand and notice. In addition, and without the condi-
tions, there is the "warranty" liability of the unqualified indorser,20 4
whereby, by operation of law, he guarantees that the instrument is valid
i97. §§ 17 (6), 63.
198. § 68.
199. §§ 45, 46.
200. § 31.
201. See §§ 2o, 44 on indorsement in a representative capacity so as to negative
personal liability.
202. § 38.
203. §§ 36, 37, 39.
204. § 66.
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and subsisting, that it is genuine, that he has good title, and that prior
parties had contractual capacity. The qualified indorser and the trans-
feror without indorsement, neither of whom incurs the "secondary"
liability, make warranties not quite so extensive 205 (in that they war-
rant that they have no knowledge of any fact to impair the instrument
rather than that it is valid and subsisting) although, in the case of the
mere transferor, the warranty runs only in favor of the immediate
transferee.
C. The Subsequent Operative Facts Creating the Procedural Advan-
tages in Favor of Additional Parties-Transfer by Indorsement,
Delivery, or Assignment 206
Now the further question arises: who is entitled to exercise the
procedural advantages against those persons who have committed the
operative facts essential to make them liable? Obviously as to the
original beneficiary of the transaction, the payee of order paper, or the
one to whom bearer paper is actually first issued, no question is pre-
sented. The same operative facts which render liable the parties whose
names are either on the instrument or subsequently procured, settle it
that the payee or first bearer shall be entitled to the advantages awarded
the ordinary holder. The question now is: what further operative facts
are essential in order that others than the original payee or bearer may
become completely entitled to these procedural advantages in enforcing
the liabilities of maker, drawer, acceptor and indorser? The answer is:
the further delivery of the paper, if it be bearer paper, or the indorse-
ment and delivery of it if it be order paper. These further transactions
of change of possession alone in the case of bearer paper and signature
plus change of possession in the case of order paper are in themselves
sufficiently commercially desirable to carry forward the procedural ad-
vantages of the ordinary holder and to cause them to be extended to
the recipient of possession in the one case or possession plus signature
in the other.
2 0 7
What conduct is essential to the most complete transfer of the
procedural advantages to new beneficiaries depends on whether the
paper is at that moment bearer paper or order paper. If then running
to bearer, nothing more than intentional delivery is essential and, as
we shall see, one of the procedural advantages is that it is presumed
that this has validly happened whenever the instrument is out of the
possession of one whose signature appears thereon. If, on the other
hand, at the moment in question, the instrument is then payable to
205. §§ 65, 69.
206. By assignment is meant a contract of transfer of an absent instrument.
207. §§ 30, 31, 34, 35.
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order, either to the order of the initial payee,2 °8 or, because this quality
has been carried forward by a special indorsement to someone else,209
then the signature of the payee or special indorsee 210 is also essential
to a completely valid transfer of the procedural advantages. 211 Com-
plicated questions arise as to whether paper is, at a given moment,
payable to order or to bearer. The Statute has explicit provisions for
determining from the manner of denoting the payee, whether paper is
payable in the first instance to order or to bearer.212 The original
parties are permitted to indicate whether the beneficiary of the trans-
action shall be a specified person 213 or another to be designated by him
on the one hand or any person on the other. If the former, that spec-
ified person can either designate another one specifically to receive the
benefit of the transaction, viz., by a special indorsement (which need
not itself contain words of negotiability) or he can, by indorsing in
blank, indicate an intention that the paper shall henceforth be payable
to bearer and that no further signature shall be essential to a complete
transfer.214  It seems clear that paper originally payable to bearer con-
tinues such despite a later special indorsement,215 but the status of paper
originally to order, made into bearer paper by a blank indorsement, and
still later indorsed specially does not seem so clear.210 In any event,
either a restrictive indorsement, or the permitted writing of a special
indorsement over a blank indorsement 217 may make more signatures
essential to a completely valid transfer of the procedural advantages
than otherwise.
There is no requirement of commercial desirability as to the mini-
mum conduct necessary for effectual transfer. As far as the law is
concerned, the parties at any stage are permitted to make it possible for
the instrument later to be transferred either by the simple act of de-
livery or by indorsement. 218 The legal detail of the Statute concerns
itself with working out specific rules to give effect to variously mani-
fested intentions in this respect. However, in situations where the in-
dorsement of a given party is beyond doubt essential to a completely
valid transfer, the law is concerned with the detail of that transaction,
much in the same way as it is concerned with the internal nature of
208. Section 184 provides for a note payable to the order of the maker.
209. See §§ 34, 40, 43.
210. Consider § 23 (forgery is an absolute defense).
211. See § 33 outlining the kinds of indorsement, and §§ 34 to 39, inclusive, treating
of them.
212. §§ 8, 9.
213. See § 8 (4), 8 (5), 41 (where two or more are named) ; § 42 (payable to one
as "Cashier", etc.).
214. §§3r, 34; cf. §35.
215. §40.
216. §§ 9 (5), 40, 48.
217. § 35.
218. § 1 (4).
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the major transaction itself. Thus, under the policy of demanding cer-
tainty in the expression of the terms of the transaction, a necessary
indorsement must be on the instrument itself or on an attached paper,
and must be manifested by the signature of the necessary indorser.2 19
Likewise, in accordance with the common law policy against split as-
signments and the commercial policy against allowing the obligor to be
harassed by competing obligees, it is forbidden to make an indorsement
of but part of the instrument, although it is permitted to do that which
neither policy forbids, to indorse the entire balance of an instrument
which has been partly paid off.22
Not oply may one whose signature is essential to complete trans-
fer elect whether to continue the paper as order paper, or, by a blank
indorsement, convert it into bearer paper, but he may also indorse in a
peculiar or unusual manner so as to limit the interest obtainable by his
indorsee and subsequent holders.2 21 Thus the conditional indorsement
is sanctioned. This enables the indorser to stipulate that both the lia-
bility and transfer aspects of the indorsement shall be conditional upon
the happening of a certain event. 222 The Statute makes this consonant
with commercial desirability by privileging the obligor to pay to the
conditional indorsee or one holding under him regardless of the hap-
pening of the condition. The result is that the matter of the happening
of the condition becomes a purely personal one between the conditional
indorser and his indorsee and those privy to the latter. By means of
the restrictive indorsement 228 the indorser can either terminate the pos-
sibility of a bona fide holder, retain for himself the beneficial interest
in the instrument, or indorse to one in trust for another. These devices
are provided in recognition of undoubted commercial demands for legal
means whereby the instrument can be entrusted to another without the
risk of embezzlement or other misuse.
224
But it is not always necessary that the mode of transfer be of a
sort encouraged by the law merchant in order for additional parties to
enjoy the procedural advantages. A much debated section of the
Statute 225 provides that the transferee for value of order paper from
the holder thereof without indorsement shall have the legal title to the
instrument and, in addition, tie right to have the indorsement (upon
suit in equity). This, in effect, allows one who is not even an ordi-
nary holder to avail himself of the procedural advantages by standing
in the shoes of such a holder who was, himself, entitled to those advan-
219. § 31.
220. § 32.
221. § 33.
222. § 39.
223. §§ 36, 37.
224. Cf. § 41 (where payable to two or more).
225. § 49.
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tages. This matter can well be analogized to the earlier discussed capac-
ity of an ordinary holder, or even an assignee, to claim under a holder
in due course and, through him, be entitled to the substantive advan-
tages.
While the permitting of a transferee of order paper without in-
dorsement to enjoy the procedural advantages might seem a departure
from the normal policy of encouraging approved types of commercial
dealing, yet, as we have seen in the case of the capacity to claim under a
holder in due course, it is nothing more than a manifestation of the
common-law rule that one can transfer what one already has. In truth,
such a transferee without indorsement does not have as many pro-
cedural advantages as the holder from whom he takes informally, for
he must prove the transfer to him by common-law rules, rather than
with the aid of the procedural advantages which would surround the
proof of transfer to him had he taken by indorsement. He acquires,
under the statutory provision, the benefit of the procedural advantages
as to events prior to the transfer to him. He would, no doubt, acquire
the same status under modern assignment statutes without the benefit
of the particular provision in the Statute on the matter. What he fails
to acquire is the present possibility of holding in due course, for only
a holder (which he is not) may have that status. The position of a
person owning under these circumstances is also akin to that of the one
claiming as a restrictive indorsee22 6 Subject, of course, to the pur-
poses of the restriction, the restrictive indorsee acquires the rights to
receive payment of the instrument, to bring any action his indorser
could bring, and to transfer these rights if the form of the indorsement
permits.227  In effect this creates in subsequent transferees almost all
of the procedural advantages, although, as for the person claiming
under Section 49, the transfers must be proved by common-law rules
and there is no possibility of a holding in due course.
[To be concluded.]
226. For a discussion of the status of restrictive indorsees, see Smith, siupra note 7.
227. §§ 36, 37, 47-
